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Abstract
This paper investigates the eﬀectiveness of the new Council Regulation
(EC) 1/2003 which replaces the mandatory notiﬁcation and authorization
system by a legal exception system. Eﬀectiveness is operationalized via
the two subcriteria compliance to Art. 81 EC Treaty and the probabili-
ties of type I and type II errors committed by the European Commission.
We identify four diﬀerent types of Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibria: full-
compliance, zero-compliance, positive-compliance and full-deterrence. We
show that the Commission can, in principle, hit the full-compliance equilib-
rium, where the cartelizing ﬁrms fully obey the requirements of Art 81(3)
EC Treaty and both error probabilities are zero.
Keywords: competition law, cartel law enforcement, legal exception, im-
perfect decision making, type I error, type II error
JEL Classiﬁcation: K21, K42, L40
1 Introduction
The European ban on cartels follows from article 81(1) of the EC Treaty. It states
that “all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of under-
takings and concerted practices which may aﬀect trade between Member States
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1and which have as their object or eﬀect the prevention, restriction or distor-
tion of competition within the common market” are “prohibited as incompatible
with the common market”.1 However, exemption from this general ban can be
granted if the requirements stated in article 81(3) EC Treaty are fulﬁlled. To be
exempted, an agreement2 has to “contribute[s] to improving the production or
distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress” (economic
beneﬁts), the consumers are to be given “a fair share of the resulting beneﬁt”
(fair share for the consumers), and the agreement must not “impose on the un-
dertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment
of these objectives” (indispensability) nor “aﬀord such undertakings the possibil-
ity of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in
question” (no elimination of competition).3
The enforcement of article 81 EC Treaty was ﬁrst laid down in Council Regula-
tion (EEC) No 17/62.4 But on May 1st 2004 a new regulation on the enforcement
of EC competition rules (Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003) came into force.5
This new regulation has been the result of the so called modernization package
invoked by the European Commission in 1999.6 A main feature of the new reg-
ulation is the replacement of the mandatory notiﬁcation system by a system of
legal exception: while under Reg. 17/62 ﬁrms had to notify their agreements in
order to be allowed to sign them, which constitutes some sort of ex ante control,
Reg. 1/2003 imposes a regime of ex post control on the ﬁrms (abuse control).7
The aim of the reform as stated by the Commission in its White Paper is
to refocus its resources on prosecuting the most serious restrictions on competi-
tion. This had become necessary because the administrational overload caused
by an increasing number of notiﬁcations every year started to endanger the eﬀec-
1Article 81(1) EC Treaty. Article 81(2) speciﬁes the legal consequences: such “agreements
or decisions” are “automatically void”.
2In this paper we will use the term agreement to cover any behavior prohibited according
to article 81(1).
3Article 81(3) EC Treaty.
4Council Regulation (EEC) No 17: First Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 of
the Treaty, OJ 013, 21.02.1962, p. 204-211, English special edition: Series I Chapter 1959-1962
p. 87, hereafter Reg. 17/62. Note that the former articles 85 (cartel ban) and 86 (abuse of
dominant market position) EC Treaty have been renumbered articles 81 and 82 EC Treaty.
5Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the
rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ L1, 04.01.2003, p. 1-25,
hereafter Reg. 1/2003. The regulation also covers the abuse of a dominant market position as
prohibited in article 82 EC Treaty. The focus of this article is ﬁrm behavior that falls under
article 81 EC treaty. Nevertheless, similar results could be derived for the case of abuse of
dominant positions.
6In April 1999 the Commission published its White Paper on Modernisation of the Rules
Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty, see Commission (1999).
7Two further changes were made: decentralization of the application of articles 81 and 82
of the Treaty to member states and strengthening of private enforcement.
2tiveness of cartel law enforcement by the Commission.8 However, the proposed
reform and the new regulation gave rise to a comprehensive discussion of the
reform in general and the introduction of a legal exception system in particular.
Especially German lawyers appeared quite reluctant towards the replacement of
the notiﬁcation system by a legal exception system. The main allegation can
be summarized as the fear that the enforcement of the cartel ban might become
ineﬀective if the notiﬁcation system is dropped, driving Europe towards a “cartel
paradise”.9
However, for two reasons the legal reasoning against the legal exception sys-
tem can be widely considered ﬂawed: First, despite using economic terminology,
most allegations are pure assertions and lack a sound economic underpinning.
Second, the reasoning frequently suﬀers from the so called “nirvana fallacy”.10
Instead of comparing the legal exception system with its real alternative, the no-
tiﬁcation system, only the legal exception’s disadvantages in relation to an ideal
enforcement system are listed.
The aim of this paper is to investigate the eﬀectiveness of the new Council
Regulation. For this purpose it is not necessary to conduct a fully ﬂedged insti-
tutional comparison of Reg. 17/62 and Reg. 1/2003.11 Rather, it is suﬃcient to
build a model that represents the relevant aspects of the interaction between the
European Commission as cartel authority and potentially cartelizing ﬁrms under
Reg. 1/2003. Analyzing this interaction, i.e. deriving the equilibrium strategies
of the players, one can predict the behavior of the involved parties. In a sec-
ond step, this behavior can be evaluated in accordance with preassigned criteria
operationalizing eﬀectiveness. We have chosen to measure eﬀectiveness via the
ﬁrms’ compliance to article 81 EC Treaty on the one hand and the probability
of decision-making errors —may they be false positives or false negatives— com-
mitted by the European Commission on the other.12 In focusing on eﬀectiveness
8See Commission (1999, para 41-45).
9The term “cartel paradise” is borrowed from Pirrung (2004). For a comprehensive survey
on the (German) legal objections against legal exception see e.g. Krumstroh (2004); for the
reactions on the White Paper by the member states see Commission (2000), for those by
European legal experts see Ehlermann/Atanasiu (2001).
10This term common to economists to describe improper comparisons was ﬁrst used by Harold
Demsetz to characterize the comparison between real markets and idealized state institutions.
As a result, state intervention is often seen as the one and only means to cure market failure
while neglecting the fact that state intervention may lead to regulatory failure as well. See Dem-
setz (1969). As for regulatory failure in the ﬁeld of competition policy see e.g. Schinkel/Tuinstra
(2006).
11However, such a fully ﬂedged institutional comparison is possible, see Will (2008). Still,
this would go far beyond the scope of this paper.
12The relevance of both error types becomes evident when considering their repercussions on
the ﬁrms’ behavior. A high probability of type I errors, i.e. good cartels are objected to and
ﬁned, may induce ﬁrms to sign bad agreements precautionary. In addition, a high probability of
type II errors, i.e. bad cartels are exempted, may also stipulate the signing of bad agreements,
as this type of error reduces expected ﬁnes. For similar reasoning see e.g. Schinkel/Tuinstra
3rather than eﬃciency in terms of welfare eﬀects, the criticism of the reform is
more aptly addressed.
In contrast to the literature on regulation, only few economic papers have
so far focused on optimal competition policy design and enforcement problems.
To our knowledge, there exist only seven: three of them —Di Federico/Manzini
(2004), Pirrung(2004) and Wils (2000)— deal with the topic in a merely ver-
bal manner, while Barros (2003) and Neven (2002) address the problem using
a decision theoretic framework. Only Hahn (2002) and Loss et al. (2008) use
game theoretic models to gain insights in the interdependent actions of cartel
authorities on the one and cartelizing ﬁrms on the other hand.
In Hahn (2002) both enforcement regimes, the legal exception as well as the
notiﬁcation system, are interpreted as means to deter agreements that fall un-
der article 81(1) EC Treaty. This is surprising as such an approach negates the
regulating nature of the notiﬁcation system and puts it on a par with the legal
exception system. Clearly, notiﬁcation and authorization as under Reg. 17/62 is
fundamentally diﬀerent in its eﬀects on the ﬁrms from the abuse control consti-
tuted by Reg. 1/2003. Further, Hahn (2002) assumes not only benevolent behav-
ior by the cartel authority but also its perfectness in decision making.13 Along
with the assumption that ﬁrms can only decide whether to sign an agreement
or not and that they are not able to inﬂuence the type of an agreement, these
premises almost eliminate the most interesting problems of cartel ban enforce-
ment, which emerge from the strategic interaction of ﬁrms and cartel authorities,
from the possibility to erroneously prohibit a good or erroneously exempt a bad
agreement, and from the ﬁrms’ potential to foresee the authority’s action and to
accordingly shape their agreements.
The hitherto most sophisticated paper on the topic is Loss et al. (2008). As
we do in this paper, the authors assume an imperfectly deciding cartel authority
committing both types of error. But despite some commonalities as for the
methods utilized, our paper is based on a signiﬁcantly diﬀerent approach. First,
we allow for diﬀerent error probabilities. This is a more general way of modelling
the possibility of erroneous cartel authority decisions. Second, we model the
ﬁrms’ decision to sign an agreement and then to shape the agreement according
to article 81 EC Treaty. In other words, in our model the type of the agreement,
i.e. whether the agreement fulﬁlls the requirements of article 81(3) EC Treaty
(good) or not (bad), is endogenous while it is exogenously given in Loss et al.
(2008). From this it follows directly that Loss et al. (2008) can only predict
the probability of signing a predeﬁned type of agreement while we can predict
not only whether an agreement is deterred or not but also —in case it is not
deterred— the probability of the signed agreement being good or bad. Third,
we deﬁne behavioral strategies not only for the ﬁrms’ actions but also for the
(2006).
13As do Barros (2003) and Neven (2002).
4Commission’s. This allows for a wider scope of actions for the latter. Finally, Loss
et al. (2008) also follow the somewhat simplifying approach to assume benevolent
behavior on the cartel authority’s side. Instead, we have chosen a diﬀerent way
by assuming not benevolent but self-interested behavior of the Commission: our
Commission seeks to fell decisions which are not overruled by the European Court
of Justice, since being overruled leads to reputational losses.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2 the game
theoretic model is speciﬁed while it is solved in section 3. Section 4 brieﬂy
depicts the main ﬁndings. In section 5 the conclusions are drawn.
2 The Model
We build a game theoretic model that represents the main features of the legal
exception system. For this purpose we consider two risk neutral players: the
European Commission, denoted as C, and a group of ﬁrms deliberating to form
a cartel, denoted as F.14
In a ﬁrst step, the ﬁrms have to decide whether to form a cartel. The decision
to do so is denoted as f = in, while the decision to abstain from any agreement is
denoted as f = out. If the ﬁrms decide not to sign an agreement, the status quo
persists and both players receive a payoﬀ normalized to zero. In a second step, if
the ﬁrms have chosen f = in, they can decide whether to form a good or a bad
agreement, denoted as a ∈ {g,b} where g stands for a good agreement and b for a
bad one. Note that under Reg. 1/2003 a notiﬁcation of the agreement is no more
necessary.15 A good agreement fulﬁlls article 81(3) EC Treaty while a bad one
does not. It is convenient to deﬁne the behavioral strategy γ = Pr(a = g) ∈ [0;1].
A good agreement leads to a gain G > 0 for the ﬁrms, while a bad agreement
yields an additional proﬁt A > 0, so that the ﬁrms are tempted to sign a bad
agreement. The assumption that the proﬁt of a bad agreement (G+A) exceeds the
proﬁt of a good agreement (G) follows directly from the economic interpretation
of article 81(3) EC Treaty: only if the ﬁrms abstain from some part of their
gain realized through the agreement and pass this on to the customers may an
agreement be exempted from the general cartel ban.
A signed agreement is controlled by the Commission with probability ξ ∈
(0;1).16 The Commission is assumed to be an imperfect decision maker. Imper-
fection means that the Commission is able to distinguish better than by pure
chance between good and bad agreements but that it makes mistakes in doing
14Both players are unitary actors in the sense that we ignore intra-group decision making
problems.
15Article 1(2) Reg. 1/2003.
16Thus, the decision whether to control a certain agreement is not an endogenous variable
in the game. Instead, it is assumed that the Commission can credibly commit to a control
probability ξ.
5so. Two types of mistakes are possible: First, a good agreement can be falsely
deemed bad and therefore prohibited and ﬁned which constitutes an error called
type I error (false positive). Second, a bad agreement can be falsely deemed
good and therefore not prohibited; this is called a type II error (false negative).
When the ﬁrms have decided upon the type of the agreement by choosing a value
for γ, nature N produces an informative signal, denoted as i ∈ {g,b}, where
i = g stands for a signal indicating a good agreement and i = b indicating a
bad one. The probability of receiving a particular signal realization is contin-
gent on the ﬁrms’ choice: ρ = Pr(i = g|a = g), ϕ = Pr(i = g|a = b). The
introduction of nature producing a signal is a technical method to describe the
following underlying idea: although the Commission does not know the actual
type of the agreement because it is not able to observe the ﬁrms’ choice, it is
not blind. It is able to gather information on the case by looking at market data
and interrogating the ﬁrms and/or other market participants. The parameters
ρ and ϕ provide a measure for the Commission’s skill to assess the type of the
agreement based on this information. With ρ = 1 and ϕ = 0 it perfectly assesses
the agreement, i.e. without making any mistakes; with ρ = ϕ its assessment skills
are zero, i.e. it is not able to distinguish good from bad agreements better than
by pure chance. In our model we assume the intermediate case 1 > ρ > ϕ > 0;
this reﬂects imperfect, but positive assessment skills. The Commission updates
its beliefs using Bayes’ rule. The Commission’s ex post beliefs are denoted as
µ = Pr(a = g|i = g), ν = Pr(a = g|i = b). The Commission then has to decide
between prohibiting and ﬁning the agreement or not to object to it, denoted as
c ∈ {p,¬p} where p stands for prohibiting and ﬁning an agreement and ¬p for
not doing so.17 It is again convenient to deﬁne behavioral strategies for these
actions: α = Pr(c = ¬p|i = g) ∈ [0;1] and β = Pr(c = ¬p|i = b) ∈ [0;1].18 The
(monetary) ﬁne is denoted as M > 0.
The Commission’s decisions are subject to external control by the Court of
First Instance of the European Communities (CFI).19 An appeal before the CFI
takes place with probability χ ∈ (0;1).20 The court is assumed to be a perfect
decision maker in the sense that its decisions are error-free in a legal meaning.21
In its judgement the court states whether the Commission’s legal subsumption of
the agreement under scrutiny has been correct. Whatever conclusion the court
17These decision options are deﬁned in articles 7, 10, and 23 Reg. 1/2003.
18Note that our model therefore allows for the possibility that the Commission could prohibit
an agreement although it believes the agreement to be good as the Commission’s decision is not
bound by the received signal. Instead, the Commission’s choice depends solely on its expected
payoﬀs.
19Article 31 Reg. 1/2003.
20This is a simplifying assumption in two respects: First, potential plaintiﬀs are not modeled
as players but are only represented by the exogenous appeals probability χ. Second, it neglects
the fact that the cartelizing ﬁrms or third parties may have diﬀerent incentives to take action.
21To keep the analysis manageable, the court is not modeled as a player but is only represented
by the exogenous probability of whether a decision is repealed or not.
6comes to is ﬁnal.22 We assume the Commission to be averse to a repeal of its
decisions by the CFI. If the decision of the Commission is correct, i.e. whenever
the Commission has not objected to a good agreement (c = ¬p|a = g) or pro-
hibited a bad one (c = p|a = b), the appeal before the CFI is not successful and
the Commission receives a payoﬀ normalized to zero. If the decision is wrong,
i.e. the commission has committed either a type I (c = p|a = g) or a type II
error (c = ¬p|a = b), the appeal is successful and the Commission receives a
negative payoﬀ of 1. This negative payoﬀ can be interpreted as the reputation
the Commission loses when it is overruled.23
Figure 1 shows the corresponding game tree consisting of the interaction of
the two players F and C and the signals generated in the Legal Exception Game.
The payoﬀ parameters (G,A,M), the control and appeals probabilities (ξ,χ)
as well as the assessment skill parameters (ρ,ϕ) are exogenously given and are
common knowledge. Thus, the endogenous variables are f, α, β, γ, µ and ν.
An equilibrium in the Legal Exception Game consists of the ﬁrms’ equilib-
rium strategy (f∗,γ∗), the Commission’s equilibrium strategy (α∗,β∗) and the
corresponding ex post beliefs (µ∗,ν∗). To evaluate the equilibria of the Legal
Exception Game in order to assess the eﬀectiveness of European cartel law en-
forcement it is necessary to operationalize the criterion eﬀectiveness. We do this
in deﬁning two subcriteria: compliance, measured as the equilibrium probability
of signing a good agreement (γ∗), and the equilibrium error probabilities pI and
pII which are derived as follows:
pI =
￿
0, f∗ = out;
ξγ∗(1 − χ)[1 − β∗ − ρ(α∗ − β∗)], f∗ = in; (1)
pII =
￿
0, f∗ = out;
(1 − γ∗)[1 − ξ[1 − (1 − χ)(β∗ + ϕ(α∗ − β∗))]], f∗ = in. (2)
Note that both error probabilities are zero whenever the ﬁrms decide not to sign
an agreement, i.e. choose f∗ = out, as a state identical with the status quo per
deﬁnition cannot be erroneous.
22Another justiﬁcation for assuming a perfect court is the fact that this assumption is wide-
spread in economic literature, see for similar assumptions e.g. Shavell (1995) or Shavell (2006).
To slightly weaken the assumption one could also think of the court monitoring the methods
applied by the Commission. Such a kind of ex post monitoring can also set suﬃcient incentives
for better ex ante decisions by the Commission.
23Possible reputation losses from not engaging in cartel control (this is the case with probabil-
ity 1−ξ) are not considered in the model. However, introduction of such additional reputation
eﬀects would not change the derived results, see Will (2008, p. 202).
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Figure 1: The Legal Exception Game
3 Equilibrium Analysis
The Legal Exception game has a proper subgame starting in decision node F1.
We solve this subgame using perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria (γ∗;α∗,β∗;µ∗,ν∗).
Having replaced the subgame with its subgame value, the entire game can be
solved by applying simple backward induction. The resulting equilibria are de-
noted as (f∗,γ∗;α∗,β∗;µ∗,ν∗).
3.1 The Commission’s optimal choices
After having received a positive signal i = g, the Commission reaches information
set I1: it does not know whether it has reached decision node C1 or C2, i.e. it
does not know the actual choice of the ﬁrms (a ∈ {g,b}). In this situation
the Commission has to decide whether to prohibit the agreement under scrutiny





I1 = −µ(1 − α)χ − (1 − µ)αχ = [(2µ − 1)α − µ]χ, (3)




= (2µ − 1)χ = 0. (4)








γρ + (1 − γ)ϕ
− 1)χ. (5)






In this case, the Commission faces a payoﬀ increasing in α and thus chooses α as
high as possible: α∗ = α∗(γ) = 1. If the opposite is true (γ < γ1) the Commission
chooses α∗ = α∗(γ) = 0, and the Commission is indiﬀerent (α∗ = α∗(γ) ∈ [0;1])
whenever γ = γ1.24 This correlation of the Commission’s behavior α and the






0 ∀ γ < γ1;
x ∈ [0;1] for γ = γ1;
1 ∀ γ > γ1.
(7)
In the same vein the Commission’s behavioral strategy β∗(γ) after having
received a negative signal can be derived again using Bayes’ rule which yields the
Commission’s ex post belief of facing a bad agreement ν :=
γ(1−ρ)
γ(1−ρ)+(1−γ)(1−ϕ). The





I2 = −ν(1 − β)χ − (1 − ν)βχ = [(2ν − 1)β − ν]χ. (8)




= (2ν − 1)χ = 0 (9)






γ(1 − ρ) + (1 − γ)(1 − ϕ)
− 1)χ. (10)
24Note that it is suﬃcient for maximization purposes to consider the ﬁrst order condition
of C’s maximization problem only. Since its payoﬀ is linear in α the second order condition
always equals zero.
25Which is, to be precise, a relation and not a function in mathematical sense, as for γ = γ1
there exist more than one corresponding values α∗(γ). Nevertheless, economists tend to call it
best response function.




1 − ρ + 1 − ϕ
:= γ2. (11)
In this case, the Commission faces a payoﬀ increasing in β and therefore chooses
β as high as possible: β∗ = β∗(γ) = 1.26 Analyzing the remaining possibilities
of the relation between the ﬁrms’ behavior γ and the threshold γ2 yields the
Commission’s best response function β∗(γ) having received a negative signal in






0 ∀ γ < γ2;
x ∈ [0;1] for γ = γ2;
1 ∀ γ > γ2.
(12)
The Commission’s best response functions α∗(γ) and β∗(γ) are depicted in















Figure 2: C’s best response functions α∗(γ) and β∗(γ)
3.2 The ﬁrms’ optimal choices
The ﬁrms have to make two choices in the Legal Exception Game: they have to
chose their optimal compliance γ∗ which is their best response to the Commis-
sion’s behavioral strategies α∗(γ) and β∗(γ) and they have to decide whether to
sign an agreement in the ﬁrst place.
26Again, the second order condition equals zero for all values of β, as C’s expected payoﬀ is
linear in β, and can therefore be neglected.
103.2.1 F’s optimal choice in the subgame
First, let us consider the subgame starting in decision node F1. The ﬁrms face




sub = G + (1 − γ) A
− γ[ρ(1 − α) + (1 − ρ)(1 − β)] ξ(1 − χ)M
− (1 − γ)[ϕα + (1 − ϕ)β] ξχM
− (1 − γ)[ϕ(1 − α) + (1 − ϕ)(1 − β)] ξM, (13)




= −A − [ρ(1 − α) + (1 − ρ)(1 − β)] ξ(1 − χ)M
+ [ϕα + (1 − ϕ)β] ξχM
+ [ϕ(1 − α) + (1 − ϕ)(1 − β)] ξM = 0. (14)




= (ρ − ϕ)(1 − χ)ξM (α − β) + χξM − A. (15)
which allows to separate terms depending on α or β from others which do not.
The right-hand side of equation (15) is positive if the following inequality holds:
β < Y + α, (16)
where Y is deﬁned as
Y :=
ξχM − A
(1 − χ)(ρ − ϕ)ξM
. (17)
In this case, the ﬁrms face a payoﬀ increasing in γ and thus choose γ as high as
possible: γ∗ = γ∗(α,β) = 1. If the opposite is true (β > Y + α) the ﬁrms choose
γ∗ = γ∗(α,β) = 0, and the ﬁrms are indiﬀerent (γ∗ = γ∗(α,β) ∈ [0;1]) whenever
β = Y + α.27 This correlation of the ﬁrms’ behavior γ and the Commission’s






0 ∀ β > Y + α;
x ∈ [0;1] for β = Y + α;
1 ∀ β < Y + α.
(18)
Figure 3 shows a possible best response function as the cascaded gray shaded
area in the unitary cube. The exact location of the function depends on the
27Again, it is suﬃcient to consider the ﬁrst order condition only. The second order condition
equals zero for all values of γ, as F’s expected payoﬀ is linear in γ.
11parameters (ρ,ϕ,ξ,χ,M,A) which determine the axis intercept Y . Due to the
parameter assumptions Y can reach any value in (−∞,+∞).
Five relevant parameter constellations (PC) can be identiﬁed in each of which
the ﬁrms’ best response functions have diﬀerent shapes:
• Y > 0 (PC1),
• Y = 0 (PC2),
• −1 < Y < 0 (PC3),
• Y = −1 (PC4),












Figure 3: F’s best response function γ∗(α,β)
The shapes of F’s best response functions diﬀer with respect to the side or
edge of the unitary cube which is intersected by the vertical part of the function.
Figure 4 shows examples for the ﬁve possible shapes of γ∗(α,β).28
Setting the axis intercept Y equal to zero or minus one yields the following
thresholds:
Y = 0 ⇔ A1 := ξχM, (19)
Y = −1 ⇔ A2 := [χ + (1 − χ)(ρ − ϕ)]ξM. (20)
It is convenient to deﬁne the following intersections of the ﬁrms’ best response
function γ∗(α,β) with the unitary cube’s sides:
β1 := Y + 1 = 1 +
ξχM − A
(1 − χ)(ρ − ϕ)ξM
, (21)
α1 := −Y =
A − ξχM
(1 − χ)(ρ − ϕ)ξM
. (22)
28Note that PC1 comprises three subcases, Y > 1, Y = 1 and 0 < Y < 1, all of which lead
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PC4: Y = −1
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PC5: Y < −1
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Y
Figure 4: Five classes of F’s best response function γ∗(α,β)
13At this stage, the perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria of the subgame starting in
decision node F1 can be derived. A perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium lies in the
intersection of the three best response functions α∗(γ), β∗(γ) and γ∗(α,β). Figure
5 shows the resulting equilibria for the ﬁve identiﬁed parameter constellations. An
unambiguous equilibrium is depicted as a black circular area while equilibrium
sets where an inﬁnite number of equilibria is possible are depicted as a black
rectangle on the corresponding segment.
In the ﬁrst row of ﬁgure 5 , the equilibria for the parameter constellations
PC1 and PC2 are depicted. Equilibrium 1 is realized if the condition A < A1,
i.e. Y > 0 (PC1), holds:
EQ1 = (1;1,1;1,1). (23)
In this case the ﬁrms fully comply to cartel law by choosing a compliance level
γ∗ = 1, i.e. signing a good agreement with certainty, and the Commission never
prohibits a controlled agreement regardless the received signal (α∗ = β∗ = 1).
Consistently, the posterior beliefs µ∗ and ν∗ also amount to 1, i.e. the Commission
knows for certain that it has reached the decision nodes C1 and C3 respectively,
which is only possible if the ﬁrms sign a good agreement.29
The equilibrium set EQS2 is reached if the condition A = A1, i.e. Y = 0,
holds. In this case (PC2) an inﬁnite number of equilibria exists:
EQS2 = {(x;1,1;m,n)|x ∈ [γ2;1];m ∈ [µ1;1];n ∈ [1
2;1]}. (24)
In every equilibrium out of this set the ﬁrms choose a good agreement with
probability x ∈ [γ2;1], while the Commission again never prohibits an agreement
regardless the received signal (α∗ = β∗ = 1). The corresponding posterior beliefs
depend on the ﬁrms’ choice and range from µ1 :=
(1−ϕ)ρ
(1−ϕ)ρ+(1−ρ)ϕ to 1 for µ∗ and
from 1
2 to 1 for ν∗.30 In addition to this, a second set of equilibria exists in
parameter constellation PC2:
EQS6 = {(x;0,0;m,n)|x ∈ [0;γ1];m ∈ [0; 1
2];n ∈ [0;ν1]}.31 (25)
Here, the ﬁrms choose a compliance level x ∈ [0;γ1] and the Commission pro-
hibits every agreement with certainty regardless the received signal (α∗ = β∗ = 0).
The corresponding posterior beliefs again depend on the ﬁrms’ choice and range
from 0 to 1 for µ∗ and from 0 to ν1 :=
(1−ρ)ϕ
(1−ρ)ϕ+(1−ϕ)ρ for ν∗.32
29The posterior beliefs in equilibrium µ∗ and ν∗ are calculated by replacing γ with its equi-
librium value γ∗ in the terms µ :=
γρ
γρ+(1−γ)ϕ and ν :=
γ(1−ρ)
γ(1−ρ)+(1−γ)(1−ϕ).
30Note that µ1 is always greater than 1
2 as long as the condition ρ > ϕ is not violated.
31The numbering of the equilibria/equilibrium sets is arranged in accordance to the inherent
compliance level γ∗. EQ1 is the equilibrium with the highest compliance level (γ∗ = 1), EQS2
the equilibrium set with the second highest compliance levels (γ∗ = x ∈ [γ2;1]) and so on, down
to EQ7 with the lowest compliance level (γ∗ = 0).
32Note that ν1 is always smaller than 1
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EQ1: (1;1,1;1,1)
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PC2: Y = 0 ⇔ A = A1;
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Figure 5: Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria (γ∗;α∗,β∗;µ∗,ν∗) in the subgame
15In the second row of ﬁgure 5 , the equilibria for the parameter constellations
PC3 and PC4 are depicted. If the condition A1 < A < A2, i.e. −1 < Y < 0
(PC3), holds three diﬀerent equilibria can be realized:
EQ3 = (γ2;1,β1;µ1, 1
2), (26)
EQ5 = (γ1;α1,0; 1
2,ν1) and (27)
EQ7 = (0;0,0;0,0). (28)
In equilibrium EQ3 the ﬁrms sign a good agreement with probability γ∗ = γ2.
This agreement is exempted from the cartel ban with certainty if the signal is good
(α∗ = 1) and with probability β1 if the signal is bad. The corresponding posterior
beliefs (µ∗,ν∗) amount to (µ1, 1
2). In equilibrium EQ5 the ﬁrms’ compliance level
is smaller: γ∗ = γ1. The Commission reacts to this behavior by prohibiting the
agreement with certainty whenever the signal is bad (β∗ = 0) and by not objecting
to it only with probability α1 whenever the signal is good. This decision is based
on the equilibrium posterior beliefs (µ∗,ν∗) = (1
2,ν1). Finally, equilibrium EQ7
is characterized by zero compliance of the ﬁrms (γ∗ = 0) and an unconditional
ban decision by the Commission (α∗ = β∗ = 0). Consistently, the Commission’s
posterior beliefs that it has reached decision node C1 or C3, which is the case
when the ﬁrms have signed a good agreement, also equal zero (µ∗ = ν∗ = 0).
If the condition A = A2, i.e. Y = −1 (PC4) is fulﬁlled, there again exist
multiple equilibria, namely the equilibrium set EQS4 and the equilibrium EQ7
already known from parameter constellation PC3. EQS4 is deﬁned as follows:
EQS4 = {(x;1,0;m,n)|x ∈ [γ1;γ2];m ∈ [1
2;µ1];n ∈ [ν1; 1
2]}. (29)
Each of these equilibria implies the ﬁrms choosing a good agreement with prob-
ability x ∈ [γ1;γ2] and the Commission prohibiting the agreement whenever the
signal is bad (β∗ = 0)and not objecting to it whenever the signal is good (α∗ = 1).
The corresponding posterior beliefs range from 1
2 to µ1 for µ∗ and from ν1 to 1
2
for ν∗.
Finally, in the third row of ﬁgure 5 , the equilibrium of parameter constellation
PC5 is depicted. If the condition A > A2, i.e. Y < −1, holds, equilibrium EQ7 —
already known from parameter constellations PC3 and PC4— is realized. Table
1 gives an overview of all derived subgame equilibria.
3.2.2 Equilibrium selection
In three of the ﬁve parameter constellations —PC2, PC3 and PC4— we face
an equilibrium selection problem. In the following, we will brieﬂy introduce a
reasonable mechanism to choose one subgame equilibrium amongst the others in
each parameter constellation.
Let us ﬁrst consider parameter constellation PC2. Here we face a twofold
equilibrium selection problem: (1) There are two sets of equilibria EQS2 and
16PC equilibrium cond. equilibrium (γ∗,α∗,β∗;µ∗,ν∗)
PC1 A < A1 EQ1: (1;1,1;1,1)
PC2 A = A1 EQ2: {(x;1,1;m,n)|x ∈ [γ2;1];m ∈ [µ1;1];n ∈ [1
2;1]}
EQ6: {(x;0,0;m,n)|x ∈ [0;γ1];m ∈ [0; 1
2];n ∈ [0;ν1]}





PC4 A = A2 EQ4: {(x;1,0;m,n)|x ∈ [γ1;γ2];m ∈ [1
2;µ1];n ∈ [ν1; 1
2]}
EQ7: (0;0,0;0,0)
PC5 A > A2 EQ7: (0;0,0;0,0)











α1 := −Y = −
ξχM−A
(1−χ)(ρ−ϕ)ξM and β1 := Y + 1 =
ξχM−A
(1−χ)(ρ−ϕ)ξM + 1.
Table 1: Subgame equilibria
EQS6. (2) Within these sets of equilibria there exists an inﬁnite number of
equilibria which diﬀer only with respect to the ﬁrms’ compliance level while the
Commission’s action remains unchanged. It is worthwhile noting that the mul-
tiple equilibria within one set have an interesting feature: they all lead to the
same payoﬀ for the ﬁrms irrespective the concrete value taken by F’s behavioral
strategy γ∗ = x. In the equilibrium set EQS2 this payoﬀ amounts to G, in EQS6
to G − (1 − χ)ξM.33 Thus, the ﬁrms are indiﬀerent with respect to their actual
compliance level within the given range. In other words, the ﬁrms do not prefer a
speciﬁc equilibrium within EQS2 and EQS6. It is therefore possible to make the
following assumption: Whenever the ﬁrms are indiﬀerent regarding their compli-
ance level, they chose the highest possible compliance level as they do not face
any opportunity cost in doing so. Consequently, the equilibrium sets EQS2 and
EQS6 can be reduced to two single unambiguous equilibria: In EQS2 the ﬁrms
33The equilibrium payoﬀs of the ﬁrms can be derived by replacing the behavioral strategies
α, β and γ with their equilibrium values α∗, β∗ and γ∗ in EPF
sub as given in equation (13). An
overview of F’s equilibrium payoﬀs is given in table 2 in section 3.2.3.
17choose γ∗ = 1 so that EQ1 is reached given the Commission’s equilibrium strat-
egy α∗ = β∗ = 1 and its equilibrium posterior beliefs µ∗ = ν∗ = 1; in EQS6 the
ﬁrms choose γ∗ = γ1, while the Commission chooses (α∗,β∗) = (0,0) based on
its posterior beliefs (µ∗,ν∗) = (1
2,ν1). This latter equilibrium (γ1;0,0; 1
2,ν1) is
a special case of equilibrium EQ5 = (γ1;α1,0, 1
2,ν1) in parameter constellation
PC3 (A1 < A < A2): it is the limit of EQ5 for A to A1 (yielding limA→A1 α1 = 0)
while A = A1 is the deﬁning criterion for parameter constellation PC2.
Let us now turn to the second problem in this parameter constellation. Re-
ducing the equilibrium sets EQS2 and EQS6 to one equilibrium each does not
fully solve the equilibrium selection problem; there still exist two equilibria in
parameter constellation PC2, namely EQ1 and EQ5. Which of those will be re-
alized? Both equilibria are consistent combinations of equilibrium strategies and
corresponding beliefs and therefore are both equally feasible. Still, EQ1 features
a focal point quality which EQ5 does not. The ﬁrms’ payoﬀ is higher in EQ1 than
in EQ5.34 Although the game is simultaneous rather than sequential because of
the imperfectly received signal the ﬁrms can be considered pseudo-ﬁrst-mover as
their “real life” move lies before the Commission’s choice.35 As a pseudo-ﬁrst-
mover the ﬁrms will try to reach an equilibrium that maximizes their expected
payoﬀ while the Commission as a pseudo-second-mover anticipates this behavior.
Thus, the players act as if the moves were observable. This concept is known as
virtual observability. This kind of equilibrium selection is not only intuitively rea-
sonable but numerous experiments have also provided evidence for it.36 Hence,
the multiple equilibria in parameter constellation PC2 can be reduced to one
single equilibrium, namely EQ1.
In parameter constellation PC3 three diﬀerent subgame equilibria exist, namely
EQ3, EQ5 and EQ7. The concept of virtual observability can again be applied
as the ﬁrms’ payoﬀ in EQ3 is higher than the ones realized in EQ5 and EQ7.37
Thus, equilibrium EQ3 dominates the other two equilibria.
In parameter constellation PC4 the equilibrium set EQS4 and the equilibrium
34The ﬁrms’ expected payoﬀ in EQ1 amounts to G, in EQ5 to G−(1−χ)ξM (see table 2) ,
the latter being necessarily smaller than the former given χ < 1 and ξ,M > 0.
35The game theoretic standard assumption of simultaneous moves whenever moves are not
observable neglects the fact that unobservability and simultaneousness in the sense of contem-
poraneity are not congruent concepts. Simultaneousness implies unobservability but not vice
versa, see e.g. Weber/Camerer/Knez (2004, p. 26-27).
36For the concept of virtual observability see Weber/Camerer/Knez (2004, p. 25-31). Exper-
iments on the subject can be found e.g. in Abele/Ehrhart (2005), Rapoport (1997) and also
Weber/Camerer/Knez (2004).
37The ﬁrms’ expected payoﬀ in EQ3 amounts to G −
1−ρ
ρ−ϕ(A − ξχM), in EQ5 to G + A −
ξM +
ϕ
ρ−ϕ(A − ξχM) and in EQ7 to G + A − ξM, see table 2 . Obviously, the ﬁrms’ payoﬀ in
EQ5 is greater than the one in EQ7, as
ϕ
ρ−ϕ > 0 and because of A > A1 := ξχM in PC3 also
(A − ξχM) > 0. More sophisticated algebraic reformulation shows that the ﬁrms’ expected
payoﬀ in EQ3 is greater than the one in EQ5 as long as A < A2 which is fulﬁlled by deﬁnition
of PC3.
18EQ7 exist. Within EQS4 the ﬁrms’ expected payoﬀ amounts to a single value
regardless the compliance level γ∗ = x ∈ [γ1;γ2] chosen, namely G − (1 − ρ)(1 −
χ)ξM. Hence, following the same reasoning as above, it can be assumed that the
ﬁrms choose the highest compliance level feasible, i.e. γ∗ = γ2. This equilibrium
(γ2;1,0;µ1, 1
2) is a special case of equilibrium EQ3 = (γ2;1,β1;µ1, 1
2) in parame-
ter constellation PC3 (A1 < A < A2): it is the limit of EQ3 for A to A2 (yielding
limA→A2 β1 = 0) while A = A2 is the constituting condition for parameter con-
stellation PC4. The ﬁrms’ expected payoﬀ in equilibrium EQ3 is greater than the
one in EQ7.38 Thus, applying the concept of virtual observability, equilibrium
EQ7 is dominated by equilibrium EQ3.
3.2.3 F’s optimal choice in the Legal Exception Game
Having solved the subgame starting in decision node F1, the subgame can be
substituted by its subgame value which equals the vector of the expected subgame
payoﬀs of both players [EP F
sub(γ∗;α∗,β∗;µ∗,ν∗);EP C
sub(γ∗;α∗,β∗;µ∗,ν∗)]. The
ﬁrms’ expected subgame payoﬀ for each parameter constellation is given in table
2 .39 The ﬁrms’ equilibrium payoﬀs can be derived by replacing in EP F
sub as given
in equation (13) the behavioral strategies α, β and γ with their equilibrium values
α∗, β∗ and γ∗.
Thus, the ﬁrms face the following decision problem in node F0: whenever
the ﬁrms choose f∗ = out status quo persists and the ﬁrms earn a (joint) proﬁt
of zero. If they choose f∗ = in they receive their expected subgame payoﬀ
EP F
sub(γ∗;α∗,β∗;µ∗,ν∗) which may be positive or negative depending on the rela-
tive heights of the agreement gains (G,A) to the ﬁne (M) and also depending on
the Commission’s assessment skills (ρ,ϕ) and the control and the appeals prob-
ability (ξ,χ). The ﬁrms will sign an agreement, i.e. choose f∗ = in, whenever
their expected payoﬀ (EP F
sub(γ∗;α∗,β∗;µ∗,ν∗)) is non-negative. Setting the ﬁrms’
expected payoﬀ equal to zero, the ﬁne M∗ can be derived where the ﬁrms are
indiﬀerent whether to sign the agreement or not. Table 3 lists these ﬁnes M∗ for
every parameter constellation.
3.3 The equilibria
Having derived the subgame equilibria and the ﬁnes M∗ determining the ﬁrms’
optimal choice in decision node F0, the equilibria of the entire Legal Exception
Game, denoted as (f∗,γ∗;α∗,β∗;µ∗,ν∗) can be derived. There exist twelve dif-
ferent equilibria, some of them appearing only in one, some of them appearing in
more than one parameter constellation. Table 4 lists the twelve equilibria with
38The ﬁrms expected payoﬀ in EQ3 amounts to G−(1−ρ)(1−χ)ξM, in EQ7 to G−[1−(ρ−
ϕ)](1 − χ)ξM (see table 2 ), the latter being necessarily smaller than the former given ϕ > 0.
39Note that the Commission’s expected subgame payoﬀ can be neglected for further analysis
as there is only F left to make a move.
19PC Payoﬀ EPF
sub(γ∗;α∗,β∗;µ∗,ν∗)
PC1: A < A1 EPF
1.1(1;1,1;1,1) = G
PC2: A = A1 EPF
2.2(x;1,1;m,n) = G
∀ x ∈ [γ2;1],m ∈ [µ1;1],n ∈ [1
2;1]
EPF
2.6(x;0,0;m,n) = G − (1 − χ)ξM




2) = G −
1−ρ
ρ−ϕ(A − ξχM)
A1 < A < A2 EPF
3.5(γ1;α1,0; 1




3.7(0;0,0;0,0) = G + A − ξM
PC4: A = A2 EPF
4.4(x;1,0;m,n) = G − (1 − ρ)(1 − χ)ξM
∀ x ∈ [γ1;γ2],m ∈ [1
2;µ1],n ∈ [ν1; 1
2]
EPF
4.7(0;0,0;0,0) = G − (1 − χ)[1 − (ρ − ϕ)]ξM
PC5: A > A2 EPF
5.7(0;0,0;0,0) = G + A − ξM










α1 := −Y = −
ξχM−A
(1−χ)(ρ−ϕ)ξM and β1 := Y + 1 =
ξχM−A
(1−χ)(ρ−ϕ)ξM + 1.
Table 2: F’s expected subgame payoﬀ EP F
sub(γ∗;α∗,β∗;µ∗,ν∗)
the two corresponding equilibrium conditions each. The equilibria are sorted by
ascending parameter constellations PC1 to PC5.
Note that according to the equilibrium selection mechanism deﬁned in section
3.2.2, some of the equilibria are dominated. In parameter constellation PC2 the
equilibrium sets EQS in-2, EQS in-6 and EQS out-6 are dominated by equilibrium
EQ in-140, in parameter constellation PC3 the equilibria EQ in-5 and EQ in-7
are dominated by EQ in-3, while the equilibria EQ out-5 and EQ out-7 are
dominated by EQ out-3, and in parameter constellation PC4 the equilibrium set
40Recall from section 3.2.2 that the subgame equilibrium EQ1 = (1;1,1;1,1) is part of the
subgame equilibrium set EQS2 = {(x;1,1;m,n)|x ∈ [γ2;1];m ∈ [µ1;1];n ∈ [1
2;1]}; the same is
true for the equilibrium EQ in-1: whenever x ∈ [γ2;1] takes the value 1, EQ in-1 is part of the
equilibrium set EQS in-2.
20parameter constellation ﬁne M∗
PC1: A < A1 M∗
1.1 ∈ (0;∞)

























PC5: A > A2 M∗
5.7 = 1
ξ(G + A)
Table 3: Optimal ﬁnes M∗ for each parameter constellation
EQS in-4 and the equilibrium EQ in-7 are dominated by the equilibrium EQ in-3,
while equilibrium EQ out-3 dominates the equilibrium set EQS out-4 as well as
equilibrium EQ out-7.41
According to the compliance level γ∗ the twelve equilibria can be grouped into
four diﬀerent types. Full compliance by the ﬁrms, i.e. γ∗ = 1, is only reached in
equilibrium EQ in-1. The equilibrium EQ in-1 is realized if the conditions A < A1
(PC1) and M ∈ (0;∞) hold and is also part of equilibrium set EQS in-2 which is
realized if the conditions A = A1 (PC2) and M ∈ (0;∞) are fulﬁlled. Recall that
equilibrium EQ in-1 is chosen out of the multiple equilibria in the equilibrium set
EQS in-2 if the ﬁrms are assumed to chose the highest compliance level feasible
when indiﬀerent about moves. We call such equilibria full-compliance equilibria.
In some parameter constellations the ﬁrms decide to sign a bad agreement
with certainty, i.e. γ∗ = 0. In such a case equilibrium EQ in-7 is reached. We call
this equilibrium zero-compliance equilibrium. This equilibrium is realized if the
additional proﬁt A is greater than the threshold A1 and if the monetary ﬁne M is
not set suﬃciently high to deter the ﬁrms from signing an agreement. Recall that
the zero-compliance equilibrium is a dominated one as long as A ≤ A2 holds.
In all parameter constellations except PC1 it is possible to deter the ﬁrms
41Recall from section 3.2.2 that the subgame equilibrium EQ3 = (γ2;1,β1;µ1, 1
2) is part of the
subgame equilibrium set EQS4 = {(x;1,0;m,n)|x ∈ [γ1;γ2];m ∈ [1
2;µ1];n ∈ [ν1; 1
2]} (whenever
x ∈ [γ1;γ2] takes the value γ2) and the limit of EQ3 for A → A2, see section 3.2.2. For the
same reason, EQ in-3 and EQ out-3 are part of the equilibrium sets EQS in-4 and EQS out-4
and the limits of EQ in-3 and EQ out-3 for A → A2, respectively.
211st cond. 2nd cond. equilibrium (f∗,γ∗;α∗,β∗;µ∗,ν∗)
A < A1 (PC1) M ∈ (0;∞) EQ in-1: (in,1;1,1;1,1)
A = A1 (PC2) M ∈ (0;∞) EQS in-2: {(in,x;1,1;m,n)
|x ∈ [γ2;1];m ∈ [µ1;1];n ∈ [1
2;1]}
M ≤ M∗
2.6 EQS in-6: {(in,x;0,0;m,n)
|x ∈ [0;γ1];m ∈ [0; 1
2];n ∈ [0;ν1]}
M > M∗
2.6 EQS out-6: {(out,x;0,0;m,n)
|x ∈ [0;γ1];m ∈ [0; 1
2];n ∈ [0;ν1]}
A1 < A < A2 M ≥ M∗
3.3 EQ in-3: (in,γ2;1,β1;µ1, 1
2)
(PC3) M ≤ M∗
3.5 EQ in-5: (in,γ1;α1,0; 1
2,ν1)
M ≤ M∗
3.7 EQ in-7: (in,0;0,0;0,0)
M < M∗
3.3 EQ out-3: (out,γ2;1,β1;µ1, 1
2)
M > M∗
3.5 EQ out-5: (out,γ1;α1,0; 1
2,ν1)
M > M∗
3.7 EQ out-7: (out,0;0,0;0,0)
A = A2 (PC4) M ≤ M∗
4.4 EQS in-4: {(in,x;1,0;m,n)
|x ∈ [γ1;γ2];m ∈ [1
2;µ1];n ∈ [ν1; 1
2]}
M ≤ M∗
4.7 EQ in-7: (in,0;0,0;0,0)
M > M∗
4.4 EQS out-4: {(out,x;1,0;m,n)
|x ∈ [γ1;γ2];m ∈ [1
2;µ1];n ∈ [ν1; 1
2]}
M > M∗
4.7 EQ out-7: (out,0;0,0;0,0)
A > A2 (PC5) M ≤ M∗
5.7 EQ in-7: (in,0;0,0;0,0)
M > M∗
5.7 EQ out-7: (out,0;0,0;0,0)










α1 := −Y = −
ξχM−A
(1−χ)(ρ−ϕ)ξM and β1 := Y + 1 =
ξχM−A
(1−χ)(ρ−ϕ)ξM + 1.
Table 4: Equilibria in the Legal Exception Game
22from signing an agreement —may it be good or bad— by setting the monetary
ﬁne M suﬃciently high. In such a case the ﬁrms choose out. The resulting
equilibria and/or equilibrium sets are EQS out-6 in parameter constellation PC2,
EQ out-3, EQ out-5 and EQ out-7 in parameter constellation PC3, EQS out-4
and EQ out-7 in parameter constellation PC4 as well as EQ out-7 in parameter
constellation PC5. We call those equilibria full-deterrence equilibria. Recall that
only EQ out-3 in PC3 and PC4 and EQ out-7 in PC5 are dominating equilibria.
All remaining equilibria and equilibrium sets (EQS in-6, EQ in-3, EQ in-5,
EQS in-4) can be summarized as positive-compliance equilibria. Recall that all
of them are dominated except EQ in-3. In such a situation the ﬁrms choose a
compliance level γ∗ ∈ (0;1) which means that they choose a good agreement only
with a certain probability.
A













(EQ in-1) (EQ in-1)




(EQS in-6) (EQS in-4)
(EQS in-7)
Figure 6: F’s compliance level γ∗ for diﬀerent values of A
Figure 6 shows the ﬁrms’ equilibrium compliance level γ∗ for diﬀerent val-
ues of the additional proﬁt A.42 Compliance levels resulting from dominated
equilibria/equilibrium sets are printed as dashed lines, those resulting from the
dominating equilibria EQ in-1 (in PC 1 and PC2), EQ in-3 (in PC3 and PC4)
and EQ in-7 (in PC5) are printed as solid bold lines. The ﬁrms’ equilibrium
compliance level is decreasing for increasing A which is not surprising: the higher
the additional gain that can be received by signing a bad agreement instead of a
good one, the higher the probability to do so. Furthermore, as long as
A ≤ A1 := ξχM (30)
holds —which is equivalent to setting the monetary ﬁne M suﬃciently high—
42The following speciﬁc parameter values were chosen for the ﬁgure: ρ = 0.6, ϕ = 0.4, ξ = 0.6,
χ = 0.3, G = 1 and M = 10.





∗ = 1. (31)
The four types of equilibria in the Legal Exception Game not only imply dif-
ferent compliance levels of the ﬁrms but also diﬀerent probabilities of the Com-
mission to commit a type I or type II error. The equilibrium error probabilities
can be derived by replacing in equations (1) and (2) the behavioral strategies α,
β and γ with their equilibrium values α∗, β∗ and γ∗. Table 5 shows the resulting
error probabilities for every equilibrium.
error probabilities
equilibrium pI(f∗,γ∗;α∗,β∗;µ∗,ν∗) pII(f∗,γ∗;α∗,β∗;µ∗,ν∗)
EQ in-1 0 0
EQS in-2 0 (1 − x)(1 − ξχ)
EQ in-3 γ2ξ(1 − χ)(1 − ρ)(1 − β1) (1 − γ2)[1 − ξ·
[1 − (1 − χ)(ϕ + β1(1 − ϕ))]]
EQS in-4 xξ(1 − χ)(1 − ρ) (1 − x)[1 − ξ[1 − (1 − χ)ϕ]]
EQ in-5 γ1ξ(1 − χ)(1 − ρα1) (1 − γ1)[1 − ξ[1 − (1 − χ)ϕα1]]
EQS in-6 xξ(1 − χ) (1 − x)(1 − ξ)ϕ









α1 := −Y = −
ξχM−A
(1−χ)(ρ−ϕ)ξM and β1 := Y + 1 =
ξχM−A
(1−χ)(ρ−ϕ)ξM + 1.
Table 5: Equilibrium error probabilities pI and pII in the Legal Exception Game
In the full-compliance equilibrium EQ in-1 both error probabilities amount to
zero (pI = pII = 0). This is due to the fact that only good agreements are signed
(γ∗ = 1) and that the Commission never prohibits an agreement regardless the
signal it has received (α∗ = β∗ = 1). The same is true for the equilibrium set
EQS in-2 if the ﬁrms behave “nicely” and chooses γ∗ = 1 instead of any other
value x ∈ [γ2;1] since EQS in-2 is reduced to the equilibrium EQ in-1 then.
In the full-deterrence equilibria EQ out-3 to EQ out-7 both error probabilities
amount to zero per deﬁnition. Whenever the status quo remains because the ﬁrms
24decide not to sign an agreement (f∗ = out), committing an error in the deﬁned
sense is not possible.
In the zero-compliance equilibrium EQ in-7 only type II errors occur with
probability pII = 1 − ξ. As no good agreements are signed (γ∗ = 0) a type I
error cannot be committed (pI = 0). Whenever a bad agreement is controlled,
it is identiﬁed as such and prohibited (α∗ = β∗ = 0). Still, an agreement is only
controlled with probability ξ. Thus, whenever the Commission misses to control
an agreement the bad agreement persists which is deemed a type II error.
Finally, in the positive-compliance equilibria EQ in-3 to EQS in-6 the error
probabilities are positive and diﬀer from each other. If we consider only the
dominating equilibria EQ in-3 in parameter constellations PC3 and PC4, the
type I error probability pI is an increasing function in the additional cartel proﬁt
A.43 In contrast, the type II error probability pII decreases for increasing values
of A.
Figures 7 and 8 show all resulting equilibrium error probabilities for diﬀerent
values of the additional agreement proﬁt A.44 Error probabilities resulting from
dominating equilibria are depicted with a solid bold line, those resulting from
dominated equilibria with a dashed one.
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Figure 7: Equilibrium error probability pI for diﬀerent values of A
From the ﬁgures follows: as long as A is smaller than the threshold value A1
(see inequality (30))—which can be easily achieved by setting the monetary ﬁne




A ⇔ pI = pII = 0. (32)
43Recall that the thresholds deﬁning the parameter constellations depend on the ratio of the
additional proﬁt A to a weighed value of the monetary ﬁne M: the greater A in relation to M,
the higher the parameter constellation.
44For these ﬁgures, the same speciﬁc parameter values were chosen as for ﬁgure 6 : ρ = 0.6,
ϕ = 0.4, ξ = 0.6, χ = 0.3, G = 1 and M = 10.
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Figure 8: Equilibrium error probability pII for diﬀerent values of A
4 Main ﬁndings
In the previous section, four diﬀerent types of equilibria in the Legal Exception
Game according to their values of the ﬁrms’ compliance level and assessment
error probabilities were identiﬁed:
Full-compliance equilibrium: The equilibrium EQ in-1 (appearing in pa-
rameter constellations PC1 and PC2) is a full-compliance equilibrium. As the
Commission chooses the strategy never to prohibit an agreement that has been
controlled regardless of the received signal (α∗ = β∗ = 1) and as all agreements
signed are good (γ∗ = 1) neither type I nor type II errors exist, i.e. both error
probabilities equal zero (pI = pII = 0).
Recall that the equilibrium EQ in-1 is part of the equilibrium set EQS in-2
(appearing in parameter constellation PC2) but that its remaining equilibria are
positive-compliance-equilibria (see below) and are dominated by EQ in-1, if the
assumption is made that ﬁrms behave “nicely”, i.e. choose the highest compliance
level feasible, whenever indiﬀerent between diﬀerent compliance levels.
Zero-compliance equilibrium: The equilibrium EQ in-7 (appearing in pa-
rameter constellations PC3 to PC5) is a zero-compliance equilibrium. Given that
all signed agreements are bad (γ∗ = 0) there is no possibility of committing a
type I error (pI = 0). As the Commission then chooses the strategy always to
prohibit an agreement regardless the received signal (α∗ = β∗ = 0) and as only
a fraction of 1 − ξ agreements remains uncontrolled, the probability of a type II
error amounts to pII = 1 − ξ.
Note that following the concept of virtual observability, EQ in-7 is dominated
in parameter constellations PC3 and PC4 and exists unchallengedly only in PC5.
Positive-compliance equilibria: The equilibrium sets EQS in-2 (except for
its element EQ in-1, see above) and EQS in-6, the equilibria EQ in-3 and EQ in-5
as well as the equilibrium set EQS in-4 (appearing in parameter constellations
PC2 to PC4 in ascending order) are positive-compliance equilibria in the sense
that the ﬁrms choose neither a good nor a bad agreement with certainty. In
such a situation good agreements as well as bad agreements are signed (with
26a certain probability γ∗) and the Commission reacts with an adequate strategy
(α∗,β∗) corresponding to its posterior beliefs (µ∗,ν∗). The result is that both
error probabilities are positive (pI,pII > 0).
Recall that all listed equilibria and equilibrium sets of this type are domi-
nated, except the equilibrium EQ in-3, which persists in parameter constellations
PC3 (due to virtual observability) and PC4 (due to the assumption of the ﬁrms
behaving “nicely” when indiﬀerent).45
Full-deterrence equilibria: The equilibrium set EQS out-6, the equilibria
EQ out-3 and EQ out-5, as well as the equilibrium set EQS out-4 (appearing in
parameter constellations PC2 to PC4 in ascending order), and the equilibrium
out-7 (appearing in parameter constellations PC3 to PC5) are full-deterrence
equilibria, as no agreement is signed (f∗ = out). Thus, the status quo persists,
compliance is not deﬁned and no legal errors can be made (pI = pII = 0).
Note that following the concept of virtual observability again, only the equi-
libria EQ out-3 (in parameter constellations PC3 and PC4) and EQ out-7 (in
parameter constellation PC5) persist; all other listed equilibria and equilibrium
sets of this type are dominated.
5 Conclusion
We have deﬁned that an enforcement system is the more eﬀective, the lower
the error probabilities and the higher the ﬁrms’ compliance level.46 Thus, if the
full-compliance equilibrium is reached, the criteria for eﬀectiveness are entirely
met. Even if only the full-deterrence equilibrium is reached one can call the legal
exception system eﬀective, as no agreements and therefore no bad agreements
are signed.
The interesting question is whether the full-compliance equilibrium is feasible,
i.e. whether the equilibrium conditions are achievable in reality. This depends on
the exogenous parameters of the model: the gains of an agreement (G,A), the
ﬁne (M), the Commission’s assessment skills (ρ,ϕ) and the control and appeals
probabilities (ξ,χ). For the full-compliance equilibrium to realize only the condi-
tion speciﬁed in inequality (30) must hold: A ≤ A1 := ξχM which is equivalent
to M ≥ 1
ξχA. This condition can always be fulﬁlled as the ﬁne M can be inﬂu-
enced in principle directly by the Commission; it is part of the Commission’s set
of economic policy measures.47 Therefore, the concerns on the legal exception
45EQ in-3 is part of the equilibrium set EQS in-4. The equilibrium set EQS in-6 is dominated
by the equilibrium EQ in-1 applying the concept of virtual observability again.
46See section 2.
47Note that art. 23(2) of Reg. 1/2003 limits ﬁnes to 10 % of the involved ﬁrms’ annual
turnover. Further details are determined in the Commission’s Guidelines on the Method of Set-
ting Fines Imposed Pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 1/2003, OJ C 210, 01.09.2006,
p. 2-5. For some analysis of the guidelines see e.g. Schinkel (2008). However, it must be left to
empirical analysis whether this cap of 10 % is set high enough to meet the equilibrium condition
27system’s ineﬀectiveness expressed by its critics are unfounded.
Our model can be seen as a ﬁrst step to a full institutional comparison of
the legal exception system with the notiﬁcation system. It is essential to under-
stand the working properties established by the new system of legal exceptions
before going any further. In a second step, the old system of notiﬁcations and
authorization should be analyzed using the same techniques and the same level of
complexity. This is a precondition to comparing both institutions in a convincing
manner.
It would be possible to reﬁne the results presented in this paper by conduct-
ing comparative statics. It would be interesting to see in detail how the results
are inﬂuenced by assuming an improvement of the assessment skills of the Com-
mission, an increase of the monetary ﬁnes or an enhancement of the fraction
of agreements controlled ex post. In addition, the model could be expanded to
include those two main elements of the reform which have not been integrated
so far: the decentralized application of the competition rules and the intensiﬁed
ex post control; the latter being implemented e.g. via private enforcement or
leniency programs.
Finally, one might ask how welfare is aﬀected by the legal exception system.
We have dealt with this matter implicitly by focusing on the eﬀectiveness of the
system. Eﬀectiveness of a legal enforcement scheme is a proxy for eﬃciency as
long as legal norms are considered to be designed to improve welfare. Neverthe-
less, an explicit welfare assessment of the legal exception regime might be worth
pursuing.
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